2 edition of Socially optimal patent protection found in the catalog.
Socially optimal patent protection
|Series||Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik der Universität Kiel ; nr. 7|
|LC Classifications||T211 .P85 1977|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||18 leaves ;|
|Number of Pages||18|
|LC Control Number||85162211|
profit-sharing arrangement, the optimal level of patent breadth can be determined by balancing the social marginal cost of distortions arising from patent protection and the social marginal benefit of R&D. 1 See, e.g. Jaffe (), Gallini (), and Jaffe and Lerner () for a comprehensive discussion. Hall, Jaffe and. The most fundamental question in intellectual property likely concerns how to identify the optimal level of intellectual property protection so as to maximize the social value of innovation. This question has been hotly debated for decades, and stands at the center of current vociferous debates over patent and copyright reform.
Absent a principled and administrable system to determine which inventions need more protection than others, the uniform patent system is our best option. This Article identifies a readily observable, cross-industry indication of optimal patent strength for . the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional.
Downloadable! Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry’s political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent. To achieve the socially optimal output: externalities. Industrial Policy Government intervention in the economy aims to promote innovative industries. Patent laws give the individual (or firm) patent protection on a property right over its invention.
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Patent Expiration, Entry, and and the socially optimal degree of patent protection. a panel of thirty drugs that lost patent protection during this period. patent protection, the patent owner realizes each year a producer's surplus COEAC, equal to the cost saving on the preinvention out-put. When the patent expires, competition ria, the shorter is the socially optimal patent life.
This is so because, at least for run-of-4And in the "drastic" invention case, at less than a linear rate. See the. In a context of imperfect patent protection, this paper analyses the strategic use of patents from a novel perspective; patents are seen as a means available to the incumbent firm to control entry.
determine the scope of patent protection. While one segment of that research advances the view that patent rights (the patent breadth), in and of themselves are sufficient for attaining the optimal degree of socially-desirable patent protection, the other segment contends that the patent. losses resulting from monopoly, which favor shorter patent lives.
He found that shorter patent lives were socially optimal, especially where demand is more elastic. The more demand moves 15 Richard Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. ();Kenneth. 8 As described by Sidney Winter, the pendulum of opinion on the “optimal’ term of protection (e.g., whether increasing or decreasing the term of patent protection would be more socially desirable) has swung back and forth over the years.
For his discussion of changes in economic thinking about. patent breadth variable. Optimal patent and antitrust policy * Both patent and antitrust policies can constrain the price set by a patentee.
Policies that determine the scope of patent protection affect pricing by defining the products that can substitute for a patented good. Greater protection from infringement-greater patent scope. Assume that the marginal cost and average total cost are constant at $ If the book store is selling the socially efficient number of books how many will it sell.
(Hint: Where would supply equal to demand if the market were perfectly competitive?) customer Reservation Price ($/book) 1 60 2 54 3 48 4 42 5 36 6 30 7 24 8 18 Select one: a.
8 b. -achieving the social optimal output -The government can internalize an externality by imposing a tax on the producer to reduce the equilibrium quantity to the socially desirable quantity. with patent protection a property right over its invention.
The patent is then said to internalize the externality. the socially optimal time). 7 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at (cited in note 2). 8 Id at 9 Id at 0 Id at 11 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § at 38 (Aspen 6th ed ) ("Patents are granted early-before an invention has been carried to the point of com.
analyzes the complex effects of patent protection when innovation is cumula- and setting prices for hardback and paperback versions of a book that do not reflect differences in their cost of production.
It should be noted, however, may be greater than is socially optimal. processes at a socially optimal rate"" Thus, a lack of patent protection leads to sub-optimal behavior. Some take a particularly stark view of the deleterious effect of patent copy-ing.
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Richard Fisher has stated that, "The result of [copying] would be the erosion of. of intellectual property protection in incentivizing innovation. The motivation for such protection tends to be the idea that without property rights, the free market might underinvest—relative to the socially optimal level—in the costly develop-ment of new technologies.
The tradeoff is that bestowing a. With both patent length and breadth as instruments, the optimal policy consists of broad patents (no imitation allowed) with patent lives adjusted to achieve the desired reward. Figure Positive Externalities and Technology Big Drug faces a cost of borrowing of 8%.
If the firm receives only the private benefits of investing in R&D, then we show its demand curve for financial capital by D Private, and the equilibrium will occur at $30 e there are spillover benefits, society would find it optimal to have $52 million of investment.
The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed‐economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi‐country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free riding on innovations.
Related Book: The Lawyer’s Meurer and Nard argue that such a cost will not be socially optimal. The DOE serves to accomodate less-than-perfect claim drafting — thus allowing a better allocation of resources. We think that Heller and Eisenberg have overstated the case against patent protection at both the theoretical and empirical.
mal patent system are and whether the patent system is socially desirable. We examine the problem of the optimal length and scope of patent protection, both for the case of a single innovation and for the richer case of cumulative innovations.
Finally, we review the issues related to how the patent system influences the market structure and. The next proposition states that the socially optimal level of patent protection induces the first innovator to patent. Proposition 6.
The socially optimal level of patent protection α∗ is such that it is only sufficient to induce the first innovator to patent. That is, α∗ = α 1. The optimal level of patent protection involves a trade-off.
Focusing primarily on pharmaceutical innovation, we analyze various policy interventions to solve this underinvestment problem. In particular, we describe a new approach for a “value-based” patent system, which ties patent protection to the underlying invention's social value, and show how it could incentivize socially optimal innovation.
The European Patent Oﬃce, by contrast, focuses on the welfare loss from exclusive use. It is not clear which policy is more socially desirable. Many studies have investigated optimal patent protections.
Gallini () and Tan-don () discuss the optimal patent life .the socially optimal amount of patent protection that different technologies deserve. It demonstrates that “time-to-market,” or the time taken for an invention to reach the market, provides the foundation for a system of tailoring patents that strikes the.Downloadable!
Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the World Trade Organization, this trade-off changes.